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During the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization (WTO), reductions
in trade barriers on environmental goods (EG) were put forward as a means
of helping developed and developing countries alike deal with current environ-
mental problems. We examine the potential e⁄ectiveness of such a strategy in
countries that rely on imports for their needs in EG. We point out that liberal-
izing trade in EG might in fact lead to less stringent environmental regulations,
resulting in an actual rise in pollution levels. We then show conditions under
which the environmental e⁄ectiveness and the welfare improvement objective
of this trade reform are compromised.
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11. Introduction
In recent years, a number of regional and international initiatives have been introduced
to liberalize trade in environmental goods (EG) such as scrubbers, mu› ers, catalytic
converters, and dust collectors. During the late 1990￿ s, for example, the Asia-Paci￿c
Economic Cooperation economies aimed at achieving zero-tari⁄s on EG by 2005 or before.
Similarly, the 2001 US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement sought to eliminate tari⁄s on many
EG over a ten-year period. The 2002 Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, in turn,
provided immediate duty-free access to most EG (Kennett and Steenblik 2005). At its
fourth Ministerial meeting held in Doha (Qatar) in 2001, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) also recognized the importance of liberalizing trade in EG (see Paragraph 31(iii)
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration).1
A key objective of such liberalization initiatives is to enhance environmental protection
in both developed and developing countries while promoting their economic development.
Countries that import EG, the assumption goes, will increase their demand for EG as a
response to reduced prices stemming from import tari⁄ cuts. The resulting decrease in
compliance costs will in turn induce local regulators to set more ambitious environmen-
tal targets. However, because of the imperfectly competitive environment in which EG
1In fact, these trade agreements also targeted environmental services, which include wastewater and
solid waste management services. However, environmental goods and services are subject to di⁄erent
trade regimes. At the WTO, for example, negotiations on the liberalization of trade in environmental
goods and services are held in two distinct bodies: the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural Market
Access and the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services. As this paper focuses on trade
liberalization in environmental goods, it therefore leaves aside speci￿c issues related to environmental
services.
2are produced, these environmental bene￿ts of trade liberalization in EG are not always
realized. Indeed, although the large number of ￿rms that operate in the di⁄erent seg-
ments of the eco-industry suggests a competitive environment, the following facts reveal
a rather di⁄erent picture. First, only a few multinational ￿rms dominate the environ-
mental market. Moreover, while it may be optimal for these multinationals to compete
among themselves, it may sometimes be rational for them to cooperate through contract-
ing and subcontracting. Second, a large number of small ￿rms specialize in the provision
of a narrow range of goods and services in particular geographic areas or market niches
(OECD 2001). Finally, the relative dominance of di⁄erent segments of the eco-industry
varies across countries according to the evolution of their environmental regulations. As
a consequence, the top 20 exporters of environmental goods in 2002 accounted for about
93 per cent of world exports. This degree of concentration is greater than in overall mer-
chandise trade where the top 20 exporters accounted for just a little over 82 per cent of
world exports (Bora and Teh 2004).
Within this imperfectly competitive environment, di⁄erent actors in the trade and
environmental regulatory processes may interact strategically. On the one hand, EG-
import tari⁄s may help EG-importing countries to extract rents from foreign eco-industrial
￿rms. On the other hand, if EG import tari⁄s are eliminated or reduced, countries that
do not produce EG may use environmental policies as a substitute for EG-import tari⁄s.
It is worth mentioning that tari⁄ barriers to trade in EG are signi￿cantly lower in most
developed countries, and for most EG, than in the rest of the world. For instance, tari⁄
3rates applied on products under the pollution management category range from 0%-3%
in the most developed countries, but 15%-30% in many developing countries (OECD
2005). Meanwhile, the OECD member countries currently account for about 90% of the
commercial market for EG, and because of high start up costs to engage in EG production,
they are generally immune from competition (Baumol 1995).2 Furthermore, over the
present decade, the EG demand is expected to grow by less than 1% in developed countries,
compared to 8.6% in the developing world (Environmental Business International 2002).
In this context, it remains important to ask a key question: how does this liberalization
of trade in EG ultimately a⁄ect the quality of the environment and social welfare? The
purpose of this paper is to approach this question by focusing on a speci￿c scenario and
answering the following set of questions. Let us suppose that an international accord states
that import tari⁄s on a speci￿c EG that helps to abate a non-transboundary pollutant
must be cut by a given amount. How would the government regulator in a country that
does not produce this EG adjust environmental taxes imposed on the pollutant? How,
in turn, would these changes in trade and environmental policies a⁄ect EG prices and
consumption? And ￿nally, what would the ultimate impact of this speci￿c type of trade
liberalization be on the quality of the environment and social welfare?
To this end, we develop a two-country model of international trade in EG. In this
model, an international monopolistic eco-industry o⁄ers EG to perfectly competitive pol-
2Of the top ten largest environmental ￿rms, four are from the USA, two each from France and Japan,
and one each from Germany and the UK (Simpson 2006). None of the world￿ s top 50 environmental ￿rms
are, in fact, located in a developing country (Geloso Grosso 2003).
4luting ￿rms. Within this imperfectly competitive framework, we show that one cannot
assert that liberalization in EG would unambiguously promote environmental protection.
If a country that does not produce EG typically uses import tari⁄s to extract the eco-
industry rents, and if these tari⁄s are subsequently reduced, we show that the regulator
might respond by strategically setting environmental regulations that are relatively le-
nient. As environmental regulations become lax, the total output of polluting ￿rms will
increase. Thus, even though the prices of EG might decrease and their consumption will
increase following trade liberalization, the quality of the environment might ultimately be
worsened and social welfare might decrease.
Despite a series of studies on trade liberalization in EG by international organizations
(WTO 2001; OECD 2001, 2005; UNCTD 2003; Bora and Teh 2004; World Bank 2007),
the economic literature includes virtually no analysis of the potential e⁄ects of this trade
policy reform. The linkage between environmental regulation and international trade in
polluting goods has, of course, been addressed extensively in the trade and environment
literature (see, e.g., Markusen 1975; Conrad 1993; Barrett 1994; Kennedy 1994; Rauscher
1994, 1997; Ulph 1997; Walz and Wellisch 1997; Copeland 2000; Long and Soubeyran
2000; Hamilton and Requate 2004). Speci￿cally, Rauscher (1997) considers a monopolistic
foreign ￿rm which exports a polluting good into a home country. In this sense, his work
is the most closely related to ours than the remaining of the above papers. However,
Rauscher (1997) considers an imported good which generates pollution when being used,
whereas in our model the imported good is used to abate pollution . In contrast to the
5theory put forward in Rauscher (1997), where environmental regulations are strengthened
to shift pro￿ts from a foreign monopolist to the domestic economy, our paper argues that
the presence of an imperfect competitive foreign eco-industry is a rationale for shielding
domestic non-traded goods industries from stringent pollution policies. Thereby, our
paper cautions policymakers against expecting an increase in pollution levels resulting
from trade liberalization in EG and makes a compelling case for them to link such trade
policy to environmental regulation.
Our ￿ndings also contribute to the growing body of trade and environment litera-
ture that takes into account the presence of an eco-industry (Baumol 1995; Feess and
Muehlheusser 1999, 2002; Brock and Boadu 2004; Carpentier, Gallagher, and Vaughan
2005; Copeland 2005; Canton 2007; Dijkstra and Mathew 2008; Greaker 2006; Greaker
and Rosendahl 2008). Within this body of work, the closest to ours are Canton (2007)
and Dijkstra and Mathew (2008). Canton (2007) compares optimal pollution taxes in two
countries that have di⁄erent abilities to produce EG. Among other things, he shows that
the optimal emission tax in the net importing country of EG will be higher in the presence
of segmented markets than in the case of a world market. Based on this result, he conjec-
tures that the environmental bene￿ts of liberalization in EG are uncertain. However, he
does not explicitly analyze, as we do, the ultimate consequences of liberalization on EG
consumption and on the quality of the environment.
Dijkstra and Mathew (2008) analyze the environmental impact of liberalization in EG.
They also argue that pollution may increase following trade liberalization in EG. How-
6ever, their work di⁄ers from ours in several ways. First, they examine e⁄ects resulting
from the transition from autarky to free trade in EG. Second, unlike the current paper,
they consider trading countries that, although they may do so with di⁄erent e¢ ciencies,
can both produce EG. Third, they model the relationship between the polluting industry
and the eco-industry as consisting of a transfer, at a ￿ at fee, of a more e¢ cient abatement
technology, which is the outcome of environmental research and development (R&D). As
a consequence, they interpret their results as stemming from how liberalization a⁄ects the
incentives of eco-industries to conduct R&D. In contrast, we highlight imperfect compe-
tition within the eco-industry as well as the interaction between environmental and EG
trade policies as the main explanations of our ￿ndings.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our model of
international trade in EG. Section 3 derives optimal emission taxes in both the exporting
and importing countries. Section 4 analyzes the e⁄ects of liberalization. Section 5 provides
a numerical illustration of our results. Final comments and suggestions for future research
are provided in the concluding section.
2. The model
Let us frame our model around two countries: a domestic country, denoted hereafter by
the subscript h (h for home), and a foreign country, which we denote by the subscript
f (f for foreign). Suppose that eco-industrial activities are technologically or ￿nancially
unviable in the domestic country, and consider an international monopolistic eco-industry
7that is owned and located in the foreign country.
The foreign eco-industry produces a homogeneous environmental good (EG) that is
sold in both the domestic and foreign countries. We denote by ah and af the amount of
EG that the eco-industry sells in the domestic and the foreign country, respectively. This
eco-industry has a cost function denoted by g (ah + af), where g > 0.3 We assume that
trade in EG occurs with zero transportation and adaptation cost. We also assume that
the domestic and foreign markets of EG are segmented. These markets are composed of
local polluting ￿rms that purchase EG to abate pollution associated with their production
process.
In both countries, polluting ￿rms produce a homogenous consumption good within a
local perfectly competitive market. In other words, polluting ￿rms do not compete in the
international market. Throughout, we also assume that pollution is non-transboundary.
Moreover, in line with previous papers dealing with environmental outsourcing (David and
Sinclair-DesgagnØ 2005; Nimubona and Sinclair-DesgagnØ 2005; Canton 2007; Canton,
Soubeyran, and Stahn 2008; David, Nimubona, and Sinclair-DesgagnØ 2008), we consider
that polluting ￿rms proceed with an end-of-pipe pollution abatement. Therefore, the
representative polluting ￿rm￿ s emission level in country i - with i = h;f - is given by
the following additively separable function: ei(xi;ai) = w(xi) ￿ ￿(ai), where ai is the
total demand for EG and xi is the total output of the polluting industry. We assume
this emission function to be twice continuously di⁄erentiable: w0 (xi) > 0 (production
3The linear EG production costs function allows us to separate the eco-industry￿ s decisions in the
domestic and foreign environmental markets.
8generates pollution), w00 (xi) > 0 (increasing marginal pollution), ￿0 (ai) > 0 (abatement
e⁄ort reduces pollution), and ￿00 (ai) < 0 (decreasing returns to abatement).
A benevolent regulator in country i introduces an emission tax ti to tackle the pol-
lution problem. In the presence of such an environmental policy, the local market for
the EG is characterized by the following inverse demand function: pi(ai;ti) where pi and
ai respectively stand for the price and total demand for EG in country i. To ensure





(@ai)2 < 0. On the other hand, the domestic country, which imports EG,
has incentives to extract rents from the monopolistic eco-industry by imposing a speci￿c
trade tari⁄ ￿ on its imports of EG.4 For simplicity, we assume that this tari⁄ barrier is
exogenously determined.
We are ultimately interested in how an exogenous reduction of the import tari⁄would
a⁄ect the quality of the environment as well as social welfare in the domestic country. This
can be interpreted as the outcome of a four-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, governments of
the domestic and foreign countries agree upon an exogenous reduction of the EG import
tari⁄. In the second stage, national regulators in both countries set their optimal emission
taxes. In the third stage, the eco-industrial ￿rm determines the quantities of EG that will
be supplied to polluting industries in both countries. In the last stage, these polluting
￿rms express their demand for EG while competing locally to supply the ￿nal good.
4For more details about the intuition behind rents extraction through tari⁄ revenues, see Katrak
(1977), Svedberg (1979), Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984), Tower (1983), Dixit (1984), Hillman and
Templeman (1985), Rauscher (1997), among others. Along the same line, Bergstrom (1982) argues that
an excise tax can capture oil rents from foreign suppliers.
93. The emission taxes
Emission taxes result from the three last stages in our game. As usual, let us solve the
game backwards beginning with the behavior of polluting industries.
3.1. The behavior of polluting industries
Let C (xi) be the production cost function of a representative polluting ￿rm in country i.
This cost function is assumed to be strictly increasing (C0 (xi) > 0) and convex (C00 (xi) >
0). In the presence of an emission tax, the polluting ￿rm will choose the level of demand
for EG and supply of the ￿nal good that will maximize its pro￿t. This pro￿t is given by
the following function:
￿i (xi;ai) = Pixi ￿ C(xi) ￿ piai ￿ ti [w(xi) ￿ ￿(ai)] ,
where Pi is the current price of the ￿nal good. To maximize its pro￿t, the represen-
tative polluter sets its marginal revenue and the cost of pollution abatement equal to,
respectively, its marginal cost of production and the bene￿t of pollution abatement, i.e.
Pi = C
0 (xi) + tiw
0 (xi) , (1)
pi = ti￿
0 (ai) . (2)
Expression (2) yields the inverse demand function for EG. This inverse demand func-
tion is downward sloping (
dpi
dai = ti￿00 (ai) < 0). Moreover, as pointed out by David and
10Sinclair-DesgagnØ (2005) and Requate (2005), any change in the level of the emission






= ￿0 (ai) > 0) and a rotation e⁄ect (
@2pi
@ai@ti = ￿00 (ai) < 0). The shift e⁄ect means
that the polluters￿willingness to buy EG increases with the stringency of the emission tax.
The rotation e⁄ect in turn means that the price-sensitivity of the pollution abatement
demand decreases with the stringency of the emission tax. This leads us to the analysis
of the behavior of the eco-industry.
3.2. The behavior of the eco-industry
To determine its optimal supplies of EG to the domestic and foreign countries, the eco-
industry solves the following program:
Max
ah;af
￿f = [ph(ah;th) ￿ ￿]ah + pf (af;tf)af ￿ g (ah + af).
At the point of equilibrium, the behavior of the eco-industry is thus characterized by the
following set of equations:
@￿f
@ah
= ph (ah;th) +
@ph
@ah
ah ￿ ￿ ￿ g = 0, (3)
@￿f
@af
= pf (af;tf) +
@pf
@af
af ￿ g = 0. (4)
These ￿rst-order conditions for pro￿t maximization yield the following solutions for
the output of the monopolistic eco-industry: a￿
h = ah (th;￿) and a￿
f = af (tf). The latter
11solutions correspond to the equilibrium quantities of EG supplied to the domestic and
foreign market, respectively. They suggest that the national emission tax a⁄ects the
equilibrium consumption of EG in each country. However, only the consumption of EG
in the domestic country depends on the level of the import tari⁄. We show below how
benevolent regulators account for this, while choosing optimal emission taxes.
3.3. The optimal emission taxes
In each country, the regulator chooses the emission tax that maximizes local social wel-
fare. The latter is de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus for the ￿nal good, the polluting
industry￿ s pro￿ts, government￿ s tax revenues, and either eco-industry￿ s pro￿ts or govern-
ment￿ s tari⁄ revenues, less the social damage due to pollution. Let v be the marginal
social damage of pollution. Assuming there is no cost associated with the transfer of













Pf (z)dz ￿ C (xf) + [ph(ah;th) ￿ ￿]ah ￿ g (ah + af)
￿ v [w(xf) ￿ ￿(af)] . (6)
12Solving (5) with respect to th and (6) with respect to tf (computational details are pro-
vided in appendix C) gives the following expressions of optimal emission taxes for the
domestic and foreign country, respectively:
























The ￿rst term on the right hand side of both expressions (7) and (8) corresponds to
the Pigouvian rate, that is, the marginal social damage of pollution. The denominator of
the second term on the right hand side of both (7) and (8) is negative (from the results
of standard comparative statics in appendices A and B.1., as well as our assumptions). It
represents the marginal e⁄ect of the tax on total emissions. The numerator of the second
term on the right hand side of expression (8) of the emission tax in the foreign country
is also negative. In line with David and Sinclair-DesgagnØ (2005), Requate (2005), and
Canton (2007), the optimal emission tax in the foreign country is therefore higher than
the Pigouvian rate. The intuition for this result is as follows. Because of the monopolistic
behavior of the eco-industry, prices of EG will generally be higher than their marginal
cost of abatement. To encourage local polluters to abate pollution up to an e¢ cient level,
the regulator must give them strong incentives in the form of an emission tax higher than
the social marginal damage of pollution.
13The numerator of the second term on the right hand side of expression (7) of the
emission tax in the domestic country, however, comprises two new components. The ￿rst
component (ah
dph
dth) depends on the e⁄ect of the emission tax on the equilibrium price of
EG in the domestic country. For not su¢ ciently convex abatement demand functions,
including linear and concave demand functions, we have that
dph
dth > 0 (see details in
appendix B.2). Therefore, in the presence of a monopolistic eco-industry, an increase in
the emission tax may increase the gap between the price and the marginal production
cost of EG. Put another way, in the domestic country, a more stringent emission tax may
increase the marginal rent paid to the foreign eco-industry. This has a negative e⁄ect on
social welfare.
Consequently, the domestic country has an incentive to capture some of this rent
using, for example, an import tari⁄ on EG. This incentive transpires through the second
component (￿￿
dah
dth ) of the numerator in (7). From appendix B.1., we have that
dah
dth > 0,
that is, the import demand for EG increases with the emission tax. In the presence of
a positive import tari⁄ (￿ > 0), tari⁄ revenues thus increase with the tax.5 From this
perspective, a more stringent emission tax will result in improved social welfare. This
second component shows that the optimal emission tax in the domestic country depends
on the tax-sensitivity of tari⁄ revenues.
Therefore, the sign of (th ￿ v) obviously depends on the level of ￿, the import tari⁄
5Although a tari⁄ on EG is attractive from the point of view of the domestic country, tari⁄ revenues
generated are, of course, somewhat o⁄set by a distortionary loss related to the presence of the import
tari⁄. This loss is implicitly accounted for in the social welfare function.
14on EG. When ￿ is signi￿cantly high, the tari⁄ revenue e⁄ect of the emission tax is likely
higher in absolute value than its price e⁄ect. As a consequence, the optimal emission tax
in the domestic country is higher than the Pigouvian rate, a ￿nding which amends the
result in Canton (2007).6 Conversely, when ￿ is signi￿cantly low or equal to zero and if
dph
dth > 0, we retrieve the result in Canton (2007) of an optimal emission tax lower than
the Pigouvian tax. All these ￿ndings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In a country that relies exclusively on environmental goods imported
from a monopolistic eco-industry to abate its pollution, the optimal emission tax may
be lower than, equal to, or greater than the Pigouvian rate, depending on its relative
e⁄ect on the price of these environmental goods and the tari⁄ revenues generated from
importation. When a high import tari⁄is imposed on environmental goods, for example,
the tari⁄ revenue e⁄ect will likely overcome the price e⁄ect, in which case the optimal
emission tax must be higher than the Pigouvian rate.
This indicates that EG import tari⁄s must interact with emission taxes in the domestic
country. The following section looks at this issue in more detail. We initially study the
net impact of liberalization on the optimal emission tax, the equilibrium price, and the
consumption of EG in the domestic country. This helps us to ultimately assess the impact
of liberalization in EG on the quality of the environment. Given that the EG production
costs function is linear, trade liberalization in EG does not a⁄ect the emission tax structure
6In our model, the optimal emission tax in an EG importing country is also higher than the Pigouvian
rate when
dph
dth < 0, that is, a tighter emission tax induces a decrease in the equilibrium price of EG.
15and the consumption of EG in the foreign country, and thus it does not a⁄ect the quality
of its environment.
4. The e⁄ects of trade liberalization
As just pointed out, expression (7) already suggests that import tari⁄ variations a⁄ect
the optimal structure of emission taxes in the domestic country. However, our analysis
needs to consider how other variables in our model also react to tari⁄ variations.
Let us ￿rst examine how an exogenous reduction in the import tari⁄rate would a⁄ect
the emission tax and EG consumption. Comparative static analysis (computations are




















































































































When th < v,7 the denominator of both expressions (9) and (10) is always negative. Based
on our assumptions, the numerator of expression (9) is also negative. Therefore,
dth
d￿ > 0,
which implies that the emission tax and import tari⁄ on EG vary in the same direction.
This constitutes our second proposition.
7Recall that th < v when
dph
dth > 0 or ￿ dah
dth ￿ ah
dph
dth < 0, that is, the equilibrium price of EG increases
with the emission tax or the import tari⁄ on EG will not be high enough to allow the domestic country
to entirely extract the increase, induced by a tighter emission tax, in the eco-industry rents.
16Proposition 2. When a country fully relies on environmental goods imported from a
monopolistic eco-industry, and if their equilibrium price increases with the emission tax
or the import tari⁄ on them is not high enough to successfully extract rents from the
eco-industry, then trade liberalization in environmental goods gives rise to a less stringent
optimal emission tax.
In contrast to the WTO and OECD positions, which single out trade liberalization
in EG as a means to induce stricter environmental regulations in countries that do not
produce EG, this proposition suggests a potential reason to keep EG import tari⁄s in
place. EG import tari⁄s give incentives to countries that import EG to set ambitious
targets, because this increases their tari⁄ revenues.
Another expectation is that EG consumption would increase as trade barriers fall. The
sign of the numerator in expression (10) is always positive, which implies that
dah
d￿ < 0.
This shows that despite the decrease in the stringency of the emission tax, EG consump-
tion in the domestic country increases when the EG import tari⁄decreases. This outcome
supports the call for trade liberalization in EG for its potential bene￿ts in increasing access
to EG.
To fully understand the forces contributing towards this increase in EG consumption
along with the process of trade liberalization, we also analyze the e⁄ects of the latter on



















+ 1 . (11)
17According to our above results and from our assumptions, we conclude that
dph
d￿

















Hence, liberalization in EG may induce either an increase or a decrease in EG prices. The




(@ah)2 < 0 (for instance, when the inverse demand function is linear or concave),












d￿ . In this context, a reduction
in the import tari⁄ on EG induces an increase in its price. This increase in the EG price
is more plausible when the emission tax does not signi￿cantly adjust downward following
trade liberalization, when the import demand for EG increases signi￿cantly with tari⁄
reductions, and/or when the emission tax does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the price-elasticity of




(@ah)2 > 0, which is possible only when the inverse
abatement demand function is convex, trade liberalization always induces a decrease in
the price of EG. Taken together, these observations yield our third proposition.
Proposition 3. When environmental goods are imported from a monopolistic eco-industry,
their consumption always increases as the trade tari⁄on them falls. Moreover, their price












d￿ , a situation




(@ah)2 > 0. Otherwise, the price of environmental goods
will increase.
This proposition con￿rms that trade liberalization in EG is a viable means of pro-
18moting the growth of environmental markets. It suggests that eco-industrial ￿rms and
exporting countries of EG unambiguously bene￿t from the globalization of environmental
markets. This is particularly true when the price of EG increases following liberalization.
In spite of this increase in EG consumption, however, improvement in environmental
protection is not guaranteed in the domestic country, since the stringency of the emission
tax decreases with trade liberalization:
deh (xh;ah)
d￿











According to condition (13), total emissions in the domestic country may increase, de-
crease, or remain unchanged as tari⁄ reductions occur. After some algebra, the above
condition writes as follows:
deh (xh;ah)
d￿
R 0 () xhw
0 (xh)￿x￿ R ah￿
0 (ah)￿a￿ , (14)
where ￿x￿ and ￿a￿ are the elasticities of ￿nal good production and EG consumption with
respect to the EG import tari⁄. The impact of trade tari⁄ cuts on the quality of the
environment, therefore, depends on the relative contribution to the total emissions of the
polluting output and EG consumption, as well as their relative elasticities with respect
to the import tari⁄ on EG. This important ￿nding is captured in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. In a country that does not produce environmental goods, the quality of
the environment may either improve or worsen following trade liberalization in environ-
19mental goods. For example, when the contribution in the total emissions of the polluting
output matters relatively more than that of the environmental goods consumption, and/or
the elasticity of polluting output with respect to the EG import tari⁄ is relatively higher
than that of EG consumption, total emissions increase as the EG import tari⁄ falls.
This proposition suggests that the potential bene￿ts of EG tari⁄ reductions to pro-
mote environmental protection in EG importing countries may not occur, since their
environmental regulations would become less stringent. Actually, a lower emission tax,
which results from a decrease in the import tari⁄, has two e⁄ects. First, the demand for
EG falls because it is cheaper to pollute and pay the emission tax than to abate at the
margin. Second, the quantity of polluting goods -and hence total emissions- rise because
it is cheaper to produce the polluting good and then pollute at the margin. Of course, as
we have already shown, the decrease in the import tari⁄ rate may also lower the price of
EG in the domestic country, which may reduce the cost of abating pollution and increases
EG consumption. However, if the two former e⁄ects dominate, it is possible that total
emissions increase with a reduction in the tari⁄ rate.
Finally, let us now predict the welfare impact of EG trade liberalization when the
emission tax is lower than the marginal social cost of pollution, which is generally the
case in many developing countries. A change in the EG tari⁄ ￿ results in the following
welfare change (see details in appendix D)
dWh
d￿


















20The net welfare e⁄ect of EG trade liberalization is ambiguous. It is determined by four
e⁄ects which have di⁄erent signs. The ￿rst e⁄ect, which corresponds to the increase in
non-internalized environmental damage, is welfare reducing. The second e⁄ect is welfare
improving as it corresponds to the value of the decrease in environmental damage. The
last two e⁄ects measure the change in revenues shifted from the eco-industry, and they
can be either welfare improving or welfare reducing. Their signs respectively depend on
how the actual level of the import tari⁄ compares to the equilibrium price of EG, and
on how the latter reacts to tari⁄ reductions. Our last proposition summarizes conditions
under which EG trade liberalization reduces social welfare.
Proposition 5. Suppose the emission tax is lower than the marginal social cost of pol-
lution (th < v). Then, assuming that the actual level of the EG import tari⁄ is lower
than the EG equilibrium price (￿ < ph), and that the latter price increases with trade
liberalization (
dph
d￿ < 0), an EG-importing country will be worse o⁄following EG trade lib-
eralization when the positive environmental e⁄ect of this trade policy is not large enough
to overturn its negative environmental and rent extraction e⁄ects.
The above proposition highlights, once again, the pro￿t-shifting role of the EG tari⁄.
In fact, EG trade liberalization increases revenues of the eco-industry while decreasing the
EG-importing country￿ s tari⁄revenues. As the two ￿rst propositions suggest, it is possible
to decrease the emission tax to slow down the ￿ ow of revenues from the importing country
toward the foreign eco-industry. However, as the emission tax decreases, the production
of the polluting good increases. Therefore, even though EG consumption would increase
21following EG trade liberalization, the net e⁄ect of this trade policy may be a decrease in
social welfare.
5. A numerical example
Let us now illustrate our results with a numerical example so as to completely characterize
the e⁄ects of trade liberalization in EG. Our numerical example uses the following speci￿c
functions. Ph = 30 ￿ xh is the demand for the polluting good. C (xh) = 1
2x2
h corresponds







emissions function. Next, G(ah) = 5ah represents the EG production costs function.
Finally, the parameter value of the social marginal pollution damage is v = 20.




























































Figure 1: Emission tax and EG price.
22Figure 1 represents the evolution of the emission tax and the equilibrium price of
EG when the import tari⁄ on EG varies. Our simulations con￿rm our result that the
emission tax decreases following an exogenous EG import tari⁄ cut. They also reveal
that the equilibrium EG price decreases when the import tari⁄ falls. In this case, we
can therefore con￿rm that the forces that induce a decrease in the price of EG (i.e. the
reduction in the distortion related to the import tari⁄ and the decrease in the emission
tax) dominate the increasing e⁄ect from a higher EG demand.
















































































Figure 2: EG consumption, total emissions, and ￿nal good production.
Figure 2, in turn, shows how the polluting good production, EG consumption, and
total emissions evolve when trade liberalization occurs. From this ￿gure, we can see
that EG consumption as well as the polluting output increase as a consequence of trade
liberalization. The fall of tari⁄barriers, however, results in an increase in total emissions.






















































Emission tax lower than the social marginal pollution damage






























































Figure 3: Emission tax and EG price: th < v versus th > v.













































































Emission tax lower than the social marginal pollution damage





















































































Figure 4: EG consumption, total emissions, and ￿nal good production: th < v versus th > v.
24Figures 3 and 4 compare our results in two speci￿c cases: when th < v and when
th > v. Recall that we are not able to sign expressions (9) and (10) in the latter case.
When th < v, the conclusions from our analytical results are con￿rmed. Interestingly,
when th > v, we see now the very same trends for the emission tax, the EG consumption,
the EG price, the pollution output, and total emissions as when th < v.
As we pointed out in the analysis of our analytical results, total emissions do not,
of course, always increase when trade liberalization occurs. The above results simply
illustrate our ￿nding that total emissions increase following liberalization in EG when the
impact on pollution of the underlying increase in the polluting output outweighs that of
the increase in EG consumption. This is likely the case when marginal pollution from the
￿nal good production is signi￿cantly high. Should marginal pollution be signi￿cantly low,
the outcome of trade liberalization in EG may in fact be a decrease in total emissions.8
6. Concluding remarks
Inasmuch as trade liberalization decreases prices of imported goods, lower barriers to
trade in EG would translate into greater access to the most e¢ cient, diverse, and least
expensive EG in countries that do not produce them. This, in turn, would encourage local
governments to set more ambitious environmental objectives. At least, this is what one
would expect. This paper argues, however, that the actual outcome of trade liberalization
in EG is less straightforward. Our results show that EG tari⁄ reductions give rise to a
8Numerical results that support this ￿gure are available from the author upon request.
25less stringent emission tax and more imports of EG. Nevertheless, the total output of
polluting ￿rms increases as a result of the laxer environmental regulation, leading to a
potential rise in pollution. As a consequence, EG-importing countries might be worse o⁄
when the welfare improving e⁄ect of EG trade liberalization, stemming from the increase
in EG consumption, is not large enough to compensate for the negative e⁄ects of this
trade policy.
The market power that international eco-industrial ￿rms enjoy is the centrepiece of this
interplay between EG trade and environmental policies. Indeed, stringent environmental
regulation generates rents for an imperfectly competitive eco-industry. Therefore, when
an import tari⁄on EG cannot su¢ ciently extract these rents, the government regulator in
an EG-importing country strategically lessens the stringency of environmental regulation
to maximize domestic social welfare.
Our ￿ndings provide policy-makers with insights regarding the main conditions under
which trade liberalization in EG would succeed in improving environmental performance
throughout the world. First, getting rid of the market power that the eco-industry enjoys
is key to ensuring that this trade reform bene￿ts those countries that rely on external
suppliers of EG. Unfortunately, EG-importing countries that would bene￿t from more
competition in the eco-industry do not have much in￿ uence in that sphere. Second, the
potential role of EG trade tari⁄s to extract rents from the eco-industry must be recognized.
Given that trade tari⁄s are an easy way to collect revenues, it becomes particularly di¢ cult
to admit that EG import tari⁄s should be lowered in developing countries, which generally
26have trouble collecting taxes. Third, the underlying connection between environmental,
industrial, and EG trade policies should be considered in the setting of international trade
agreements targeting EG.
Several interesting dimensions of this issue have not been addressed by our analysis.
First, although connections exist between trade in environmental goods and trade in envi-
ronmental services, this paper has focused solely on environmental goods. Thus, speci￿c
issues related to trade liberalization in environmental services remain to be analyzed.9
Second, we have ignored the foreign direct investments inducement by EG tari⁄ barriers.
In fact, eco-industrial ￿rms create subsidiaries in host countries for most of their contracts
abroad (Steenblik, Drouet, and Stubbs 2005). How this situation relies on the presence of
tari⁄ barriers to trade in EG still needs to be examined. Third, since the level of import
tari⁄s are in reality endogenously determined, an analysis of the optimal combination of
EG trade and environmental policies would be of particular interest. Fourth, it would be
useful to compare the results of marginal and non-marginal trade liberalization. Fifth,
our analysis could be extended to verify whether trade liberalization in EG aimed at deal-
ing with transboundary pollution abatement would have the same environmental e⁄ect
as that demonstrated in this paper.10 Finally, eco-industry representatives often present
9For instance, while tari⁄s constitute the main trade barrier on environmental goods, they are not
applied to environmental services. On the services side, potential barriers include everything else that can
inhibit trade: allowing exports of services only through ￿rms with commercial presence in the importing
country, limiting the scope of foreign business to speci￿ed activities, etc. (OECD 2005).
10To this end, our model would be amended by specifying pollution damage functions that depend
upon emissions levels in both countries. Intuitively, the quality of the environment in the foreign country
is in this case also a⁄ected by trade liberalization in environmental goods. As a consequence, regulators
in both countries have incentives to coordinate their e⁄orts to deal with market distortions that exist in
the eco-industry.
27the globalization of environmental markets as a stimulus of mergers and acquisitions in
this industry. Since this would give rise to a more concentrated and (market) powerful
eco-industry, which is central to the environmental impact of trade liberalization in EG,
it would be interesting to analyze the interplay between trade policy targeting EG, envi-
ronmental policy, and mergers￿activities in the eco-industry. These are some of the issues
left for further research.
Appendices
A. Comparative-static analysis for the polluting industry


















From our assumptions, we have that
dxi
dti < 0 and
dai
dti > 0.
28B. Comparative-static analysis for the eco-industry
B.1. Impact of environmental taxation on the equilibrium supply of EG
























































Our assumptions imply that
dah
dth > 0 and
daf
dtf > 0.
B.2. Impact of environmental taxation on the equilibrium price of EG


























This is equivalent to
dph
























29From our assumptions and the results in appendix (B.1), we can show that
dph
dth > 0 always
if ph (ah;th) is linear or concave in ah. Similarly,
dpf
dtf > 0 always if pf (af;tf) is linear or
concave in af.
C. Optimal emission taxes
Totally di⁄erentiating (5) with respect to th and (6) with respect to tf yields, respectively
dWh
dth














































































































































Solving equations (C-5) with respect to th and (C-6) with respect to tf gives, respectively,
expressions (7) and (8).
D. E⁄ects of import tari⁄ variations































dth ￿ ￿0 (ah)
dah



























































































































31Now, totally di⁄erentiating (5) with respect to ￿ yields
dWh
d￿






















































which also corresponds to
dWh
d￿
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